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The increased use of social networking applications on smartphones makes these devices
a goldmine for forensic investigators. Potential evidence can be held on these devices and
recovered with the right tools and examination methods. This paper focuses on conducting
forensic analyses on three widely used social networking applications on smartphones:
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. The tests were conducted on three popular smartphones:
BlackBerrys, iPhones, and Android phones. The tests consisted of installing the social
networking applications on each device, conducting common user activities through each
application, acquiring a forensically sound logical image of each device, and performing
manual forensic analysis on each acquired logical image. The forensic analyses were aimed
at determining whether activities conducted through these applications were stored on
the device’s internal memory. If so, the extent, signiﬁcance, and location of the data that
could be found and retrieved from the logical image of each device were determined. The
results show that no traces could be recovered from BlackBerry devices. However, iPhones
and Android phones store a signiﬁcant amount of valuable data that could be recovered
and used by forensic investigators.
ª 2012 A. Marrington, N. Al Mutawa & I. Baggili. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

1. Introduction
The last several years have witnessed the rapid evolution of a new form of online communication known as
social networking. By joining websites that offer these
services, users can interact and socialize, share information
and ideas, post comments and updates, participate in
activities and events, upload ﬁles and photos, and engage in
real-time instant messaging and conversations. These
websites attract millions of people from all over the world.
A study estimated that the number of unique users of
online social networks worldwide was about 830 million at
the end of 2009 (International Telecommunications Union,
2010).
Despite being primarily used to communicate and
socialize with friends, the diverse and anonymous nature of
social networking websites makes them highly vulnerable to
cybercrimes. Phishers, fraudsters, child predators, and other
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ971 4 402 1199; fax: þ971 4 402 1017.
E-mail address: andrew.marrington@zu.ac.ae (A. Marrington).

cyber criminals can register to these services with fake
identities, hiding their malicious intentions behind innocentappearing proﬁles. Social networks also encourage the
publication of personal data, such as age, gender, habits,
whereabouts, and schedules. The wealth of personal information uploaded to these websites makes it possible for
cyber criminals to manipulate this information to their
advantage and use it to commit criminal acts. Other abusive
activities that can be committed on these websites include
uploading illegal or inappropriate material, defaming, and
stalking (de Paula, 2009). The large number of criminal acts
that can be performed through social networks raises the
importance of digital forensics in this area. Electronic
evidence retrieved from social networking activities on
a suspect’s machine can be of great assistance in investigating
a criminal case by incriminating or proving the innocence of
a suspect.
Besides accessing social networking sites via desktop
computers and laptops, subscribers can use their smartphones to tap into these services. A survey conducted by
Ruder Finn (a PR agency) showed that “91% of smartphone
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users go online to socialize compared to only 79% of
traditional desktop users”. It also showed that 43% of
smartphone users use them to communicate with people
on social networking sites (Finn, 2012). Approximately half
of Facebook’s users access Facebook through a mobile
device, such as a smartphone or tablet. According to Facebook, these users are twice as active as users who do not
access Facebook through a mobile device (Facebook, 2011).
Given that millions of users access social networks through
smartphones and that smartphones provide 24/7 access to
these services, there is a high risk of the abuse of these
services by users with malicious intentions. Therefore,
when a forensic examination is performed on a suspect’s
smartphone, there might be a chance of ﬁnding evidence
that supports criminal prosecution.
Forensic examination of smartphones is challenging.
Smartphones are always active and are constantly updating
data, which can cause faster loss of evidentiary data.
Second, the operating systems (OS) of smartphones are
generally closed source, with the notable exception of
Linux-based smartphones, which makes creating custom
tools to retrieve evidence a difﬁcult task for forensic
examiners. In addition, smartphone vendors tend to release
OS updates very often, making it hard for forensic examiners to keep up with the examination methods and tools
required to forensically examine each release. The variety
of proprietary hardware of smartphones is another issue
faced by forensic examiners (Al Zarouni, 2006).
This paper focuses on conducting forensic analyses on
three widely used social networking applications on
smartphones: Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. The tests
were conducted on three popular smartphones: BlackBerry
Torch 9800, iPhone 4, and the Android-based Samsung
Galaxy S, and consisted of installing the social networking
applications on each device, conducting common user
activities through each application, acquiring a forensically-sound logical image of each device, and performing
a manual forensic analysis on each acquired image. The
purpose of our analysis was to determine whether activities
conducted through these applications were stored on the
device’s internal memory. If so, the amount, signiﬁcance,
and locations of data that could be found and retrieved
from the logical image of each device were determined.
2. Related work
2.1. Mobile device forensics
Initial work in this ﬁeld has focused on acquisition
techniques and general forensic analyses of smart devices.
In his paper, Burnette discussed the forensic examination of
older versions of the BlackBerry and covered the hardware
and software used for acquisition (Burnette, 2002). He also
described several methods of examination, including the
use of hex editors and emulators. Later research provided
foundational concepts on forensic analyses of the new
generations of smartphones (e.g., BlackBerry and iPhone). It
outlined the technologies used, the handling procedures,
and the common evidence storage locations for each
device. The data that could be extracted from the internal
memory of these devices included call logs, SMS, MMS,
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emails, webpage bookmarks, photos, videos, and calendar
notes (Punja and Mislan, 2008).
Recent scientiﬁc research has focused on individual
types of smartphones, investigating the methods that could
be used to acquire and analyze the internal memory of the
device and the data that could be extracted from each
device. iPhone data could be acquired by either a physical
or a logical method. The physical method requires jailbreaking the system, which causes a slight modiﬁcation to
the system’s data (Kubasiak et al., 2009). However, the
latest technique developed by Zdziarski acquires a physical-logical image of an iPhone without jailbreaking the
phone (Zdziarski, 2010). It is considered the best forensic
method for acquiring iPhone and has been evaluated by the
National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST)
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010).
Similar to iPhones, Android-based smartphones can also be
acquired using either a physical or a logical method. The
physical technique consists of obtaining a dd image of the
phone’s memory and requires root access to the device
(Lessard and Kessler, 2010). Vidas et al. discuss an acquisition methodology based on overwriting the “Recovery”
partition on the Android device’s SD card with specialized
forensic acquisition software (Vidas et al., 2011).
2.2. Social networking forensic artifacts
Scientiﬁc research has also included the investigation of
artifacts left by social networking sites on computer
systems and tools that assist in the extraction of these
artifacts. Zellers has examined the unique data tags created
in different MySpace source-code pages and used these
tags to create focused artifact keyword searches (Zellers,
2008). Other research discussed the process of recovering
and reconstructing Facebook chat artifacts from
a computer’s hard disk (Al Mutawa et al., 2011).
Because many social networking applications are integrated into new smartphones, in cases involving social
networks, forensic examiners may be able to ﬁnd relevant
evidence on a suspect’s smartphone. A forensic examination
of the iPhone 3GS (via a logical acquisition) showed that
a database related to the Facebook application is stored on the
phone’s memory. The database stores data for each friend in
the list, including their names, ID numbers, and phone
number (Bader and Baggili, 2010). Two other directories
related to the Twitter application were also found. These
directories store information about Twitter account data,
attachments sent with tweets, user names, and tweets with
date and time values (Morrissey, 2010). A forensic examination of an Android phone’s logical image showed that basic
Facebook friend information is stored in the contacts database
(contacts.db) as the device “synchronizes contact’s Facebook
status updates with the phone book” (Lessard and Kessler,
2010). It also showed that the device stores Twitter passwords and Twitter updates performed through the Twitter
application in plain text (Lessard and Kessler, 2010). Forensic
research papers on BlackBerry phones and Windows smartphones, however, did not mention ﬁnding or recovering any
data related to the use of social networking applications.
Similar to computers, smartphones store data that can
help determine how the device has been used or misused.
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Therefore, activities performed through social networks
applications may be stored on smartphones. However,
previous research has been limited to the recovery of very
basic information related to the use of social networking
applications. It is clear that further experiments focusing on
the recovery of artifacts related to the use of social
networking applications are required to determine
whether activities performed through these applications
are stored and can be recovered from smartphones.

rooted Android devices. The experiments were designed
accordingly.

3.1. Test environment and requirements
Prior to conducting the experiments, a forensic workstation was set up and conﬁgured. Once the forensic
workstation was ready, it was isolated from the lab’s
network. The following is a list of the hardware and software used to conduct the experiment:

3. Methodology
The main purpose of this research is to determine
whether activities performed through smartphone social
networking applications are stored on the internal memory
of these devices and whether these data can be recovered.
These data can be of high evidentiary value, which can
assist in the investigation of criminal, civil, or other types of
cases. The goal of this study was achieved by conducting
experiments on a number of smartphones. Manual forensic
examinations and analyses were performed on three
commonly used social networking applications on smartphones: Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. The experiments
were conducted on three popular smartphones: BlackBerrys, iPhones, and Android phones.
In a real investigation, law enforcement agencies may
have access to data from the social networking providers.
Depending on the nature of the investigation, jurisdictional
issues and the degree to which the social networking
provider is co-operative with law enforcement, the
provider may prove to be a more convenient source of
digital evidence about social networking use than the
smartphone. However, investigation the smartphone has
two-fold value. It is often useful to corroborate evidence
from different sources, such as from the provider and then
from the smartphone. Moreover, especially in an era of
ubiquitous mobile Internet connections, many traditional
telephony services (such as text messaging) are provided
via social networking sites through their smartphone apps.
It may be crucial to the reconstruction of a crime to know
whether particular social networking activities (already
reﬂected in data from the service provider) took place on
a particular smartphone.
The experiments were conducted using forensically
sound approaches and under forensically acceptable
conditions to fulﬁll a crucial rule in digital forensics, which
is to preserve the integrity of the original data and to
prevent it from any contamination that would interfere
with its acceptance in court. The test and examination
procedure was derived from the Computer Forensics Tool
Testing program guidelines established by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to ensure the
quality of the testing methods and the reliability and validity of the results (National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2001).
The research aimed to work with realistic data similar to
that found in an actual investigation. In a real investigation,
suspects may use different social networking applications
on smartphones and conduct different activities through
each of them. They may also use jailbroken iPhones or

 Two Blackberry Torch 9800 phones (software version:
6.0 Bundle 862).
 Two iPhone 4 devices, 32GB (version 4.3.3 8J2).
 One Android phone (Samsung GT-i9000 Galaxy S –
Firmware version 2.3.3).
 Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace applications for each
tested phones.
 BlackBerry Desktop Software (version 6.1.0 B34).
 Apple iTunes Application (version 10.4.0.80).
 TextPad (version 4.5.2).
 Plist Editor for Windows (version 1.0.1).
 SQLite Database Browser (version 1.3).
 DCode (version 4.02a).
 EnCase (version 6.5).
 A software USB write-blocker (Thumbscrew).
 USB data cables.
 A Micro SD card.
 A Micro SD card reader.
 Odin3 (version 1.3), a tool to upload a root-kit to the
Android device.
 MyBackup Rerware, LLC (version 2.7.7).
The conﬁgurations of the smartphones were not altered.
Temporary storage cache sizes, for instance, were not
modiﬁed from factory defaults. Changing the default cache
size would likely affect the volume of recoverable digital
evidence found on the smartphone.

3.2. Test procedure
The test procedure consisted of three stages: scenarios,
logical acquisition, and analysis. The following sections
describe each stage in details.
3.2.1. Scenarios
This stage involved conducting common user activities
on social networking applications on the smartphones. The
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace applications were installed
on each device if they were not already integrated with the
device. These applications were chosen simply because of
their availability as stand-alone applications for each platform. For the purpose of the experiments, ﬁctional
accounts with ﬁctional users were created on each social
networking website and were logged into and used
through the smartphones’ applications. For each device,
a predeﬁned set of activities were conducted using each
application. The activities were chosen to represent
common activities, such as uploading photos, posting
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comments, sending emails within the application, and
chatting.
3.2.2. Logical acquisition
The second stage involved acquiring a logical image of
the internal memory of each device. The acquisitions were
performed in a controlled environment using forensically
sound techniques to ensure the integrity of the acquired
data and its potential admissibility in court. As is always the
case with all logical acquisitions, there is the possibility that
data remnants of inactive ﬁles may be missed in the course
of such an acquisition. In computer forensics for example,
a logical acquisition may miss data stored in slack space.
The same issue exists with all logical acquisition techniques
for smartphones.
As the tested phones had three different operating
systems, speciﬁc tools and conﬁgurations were required to
manually acquire a logical image of each device. Detailed
methods of acquisition are presented later in the paper.
3.2.3. Analysis
The third stage involved performing forensic examinations to the acquired logical image of each device, to
determine whether the activities conducted through these
applications were stored on the device’s internal memory.
If so, the amount, location, and signiﬁcance of the data that
could be found and retrieved from the logical image of each
device were determined. The examinations were conducted manually using a number of tools to view the
acquired images, determine the unique headers or signatures in each structure, search for data related to the social
networking applications, and determine how these data
were stored on each device.
4. Implementation and analysis
The ﬁrst stage of the experiment involved installing the
social networking applications and conducting the predeﬁned activities on each device. This stage was straightforward and general for all of the tested devices. For the
two BlackBerry Torch phones, the Facebook, Twitter, and
MySpace applications were already preinstalled by the
manufacturer. For the two iPhones, Facebook (version
3.4.4), Twitter (version 3.3.5), and MySpace (version 2.0.7)
were downloaded from the App Store and installed on the
devices. For the Android phone, Facebook (version 1.6.3),
Twitter (version 2.1.2), and MySpaceDroid (version 1.0.7)
were downloaded from the Android Market and installed
on the devices. All of the tested applications were created
by the ofﬁcial social networking companies except for
MySpaceDroid (the ofﬁcial MySpace application could not
be installed on the tested Android phone).
Once the applications were installed on the devices, the
predeﬁned activities were conducted on each device. The
activities represented common user activities and activities
that would of interest to the forensic examiner. These activities included uploading photos, posting comments, sending
emails, and chatting. Table 1 represents all activities that have
been performed on each application of each tested device.
Similar activities were conducted on each tested phone;
however, unique data were used on each application for
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Table 1
Activities performed on each application of each tested device.
Application

Performed activities

Comments

Facebook

Login with user name:
infected.mushroom2011
@hotmail.com
and password: mushroom77
Post in news feed
Upload photos þ captions
Send email messages
Post on friend’s wall
Instant messaging (chat)
View proﬁles of friends
Login with user name:
infected.mushroom2011
@hotmail.com
and password: mushroom246
Follow people
Post tweets
Upload photos
Login with user name:
infected.mushroom2011
@hotmail.com
and password: mushroom888
Upload pictures

–

Twitter

MySpace

Add friends
Change status
Check emails
Send emails
Post comments
View proﬁles
Instant messaging (chat)

–
–
–
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–

Did not function
for Android
–
–
–
–
–
–
Did not function
for Android

each phone to reduce redundant data and simplify the
analysis phase. After conducting the social networking
activities on the tested phones, a logical image of the
internal memory of each device was acquired and analyzed
for evidence of the conducted activities. Table 2 shows a list
of keywords used to search for traces of each social
networking application’s usage. The following sections
describe the procedures used for the acquisition and
analysis of each tested smartphone.
4.1. BlackBerry forensic examination
This section describes the process of the logical acquisition and forensic analysis of the two tested BlackBerry
phones. The processes for both phones were identical, and
the analysis results were similar.

Table 2
Keywords for searching for social networking activity.
Application

Keywords

All
MySpace

infected.mushroom2011@hotmail.com
mushroom888, infected mushroom,
gloomy, hello myspace
mushroom246, ForensicFocus, Jzdiarski,
jonathan zdziarski, Sctan, Mushrooom2011,
“Amazing how time runs fast!!”, “so hot and humid!!”
mushroom77, “craving for shake shack!!”,
“hello cheza”, “lets go to the mall”, “hellooooo”,
“hey im here”, “what time shall we go?”, “9pm?”,
“ok see u later”, Infected, Cheza,

Twitter

Facebook
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4.1.1. Logical acquisition
The logical acquisition of the BlackBerry phones was
performed using BlackBerry Desktop Software (BDS). BDS is
a management application that is freely available on the
BlackBerry ofﬁcial website. It is designed to synchronize
data, applications, and media ﬁles between the BlackBerry
device and the host computer. It is also used to create
backup copies of data from the BlackBerry phone and save
them on the host computer. BDS is not designed for forensic
acquisition. However, there are several advantages of using
it to acquire a logical copy of a BlackBerry device. First, it is
produced by the same company which produces the
device; thus, more data may be obtained using BDS than
with some forensic tools produced by companies with
lesser familiarity with BlackBerry. Finally, backup ﬁles
acquired through BDS can be inspected using a BlackBerry
emulator.
A rule of thumb in the ﬁeld of digital forensics is not to
alter the original data acquired from the subject’s device. By
default, BDS is set to synchronize the phone’s date and time
with those of the host computer. If this option is not
deactivated, it can strongly affect the validity of evidence in
a criminal investigation by changing the original dates and
times of the subject phones, contaminating the evidence.
Therefore, this option must be explicitly disabled before
attempting to attach and backup the subject’s phone.
After conﬁguring BDS to not synchronize the BlackBerry
phone with the host computer, a logical bit-by-bit image of
the test device was created using the “Backup” option from
the Device menu. The logical image was created manually
by performing a full backup of the device. Once the backup
process was completed, the device was disconnected from
the forensic workstation.
4.1.2. Examination and analysis
Acquiring a logical image of the BlackBerry phones
resulted in the creation of a single proprietary IPD ﬁle for
each phone. The ﬁles were stored within the default backup
directory and by default had the naming style “BlackBerry
model (current date).ipd” (e.g., BlackBerry Torch 9800 (July
30, 2011).ipd). Viewing the IPD ﬁle using a text editor
showed that it had a unique header that starts with “Inter@
ctive Pager Backup/Restore File”. The ﬁle contained databases of user data and conﬁgurations. Examining the
contents of the ﬁles revealed that they contained user data,
such as contacts, SMS messages, MMS messages, and call
logs. However, no traces of the social networking activities
performed during the test were found.
4.2. iPhone forensic examination
This section describes the process of the logical acquisition and forensic analysis of the two iPhones. The acquisition processes for both phones were identical, and the
analysis results were similar.
4.2.1. Logical acquisition
The logical acquisitions of the iPhone 4G devices were
performed using the Apple iTunes application (version
10.4.0.80). Similar to BDS, iTunes is a synchronization and
management application and is freely available on the

Apple ofﬁcial website. It is designed to synchronize data,
applications, and media ﬁles between Apple devices (e.g.,
iPhone, iPad, and iPod) and the host computer. It is also
used to create backup copies of data from the Apple device
and save them on the host computer. iTunes is not designed
for forensic acquisition. However, it is an option that
forensic practitioners can use to obtain a logical image
(backup ﬁle) of an Apple device. Backup ﬁles may also exist
on the suspect’s computer if the suspect had previously
performed a sync operation or a software update or
restored their device to its factory settings.
It is critical for a forensic examiner to ensure the
integrity of the acquired evidence. Therefore, the iPhone
logical acquisitions were conducted in a forensically sound
environment. Before attaching each iPhone to the forensic
workstation, it was critical to disable automatic synchronization option from the iTunes application. By default,
iTunes automatically syncs the device to the host computer
once the device is connected.
Disabling automatic synchronization preserves the
integrity of the iPhone’s data, as it prevents the user’s data
from being exchanged between the iPhone and the host
computer. Once iTunes was conﬁgured, the iPhone was
attached to the forensic workstation through a USB data
cable. After being detected by the iTunes application, a logical
acquisition was manually initiated by right-clicking on the
device name and selecting “backup”. iTunes created a backup
copy of the iPhone, and by default, it placed the backup ﬁles
in the following directory: C:\Users\[user]\AppData\Roaming\Apple Computer\MobileSync\Backup\[unique identiﬁer]. Once the backup process was completed, the iPhone was
disconnected from the forensic workstation.
4.2.2. Examination and analysis
Acquiring a logical image of the iPhones using iTunes
resulted in the creation of a folder with a unique alphanumeric name (hash value) for each iPhone, which contained the backed-up logical ﬁle. Both folders included
three plist ﬁles, one mbdb ﬁle, one mbdx ﬁle, and a number
of backup ﬁles with no apparent extensions. Each of the
backup ﬁles was distinguished by a unique alphanumeric
identiﬁer of 40 characters.
Viewing and examining the backup ﬁles in a text editor
showed that these ﬁles are in binary format or plain text that
may contain encapsulated images, SQLite database ﬁles, or
other plist ﬁles. To examine the contents of each ﬁle, they
had to be decoded and viewed using the appropriate tools.
Each ﬁle type was determined by the header contained
within the ﬁle. Files starting with the header “bplist00”
contained binary plist data, and ﬁles starting with the
header “SQLite format 3” contained SQLite databases. A
number of tools were used to manually examine the
contents of the backup ﬁles according to their type. Plist
Editor for Windows (version 1.0.1) was used to help read and
examine backup ﬁles that contained plist data, and SQLite
Database Browser (version 1.3) was used to help read and
examine backup ﬁles that contained SQLite databases.
Manual examination of the backup ﬁles showed that
they contained a vast amount of user data, including sent
and received SMS, calendar events, call history, and address
book entries. However, the main focus of this research was
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to determine whether footprints of social networking
applications were stored within these backup ﬁles. The
Command-line utility was used to manually search the ﬁles
within the backup directory for keywords that relate to the
social networking activities conducted during the experiment. Files containing the keywords were then decoded
using the appropriate tools (e.g., Plist Editor and SQLite
Database Browser), and their contents were thoroughly
examined for traces of the activities that were conducted
earlier in the experiment.

4.2.2.1. Facebook artifacts. Examination and analysis of the
backup ﬁles revealed a number of SQLite and plist ﬁles related
to the tested social networking applications. Many ﬁles contained the strings “Facebook”, “Twitter”, and “MySpace”;
however, only a few contained data of interest to the forensic
examiner. Three ﬁles contained data related to the iPhone
Facebook application. The ﬁrst two ﬁles were SQLite databases
with the hashed names 6639cb6a02f32e0203851f254
65ffb89ca8ae3fa and 9f2140d8e87b45a9bb5dfc813fd2299c02851e6b. Viewing the ﬁrst ﬁle using the SQLite Database
Browser showed that it contained a table that stored Facebook
friend data. The table stored the friends’ proﬁle IDs, ﬁrst and
last names, URLs pointing to their proﬁle pictures on Facebook, phone numbers, and email addresses.
The second ﬁle contained traces of the user’s previous
activities of uploading photos and posting comments
through the Facebook application. It stored data such as the
user’s name, proﬁle ID, the nature of the activity performed
(e.g., uploading photos), and timestamps of the performed
activities. The timestamps were stored in UNIX numeric
values. Comparing the decoded date and times to the date
and times of the activities performed on the actual Facebook webpage showed that the pictures were uploaded
and the comments were posted within the same period of
time. Fig. 1 shows the actual activities as they were presented on the Facebook website. Fig. 2 shows the traces of
activities stored in the SQLite database.
The third ﬁle that contained data related to the iPhone
Facebook application was a plist ﬁle with the hashed name
384eb9e62ba50d7f3a21d9224123db62879ef423. The ﬁle
stored details about the user, including the last email
address used to log into the Facebook account, the unique
identiﬁer (ID) that identiﬁed the user’s proﬁle and user
name, and a URL address pointing to the user’s proﬁle
picture on Facebook.
Further examination of the plist ﬁle 384eb9e62ba50d7f3a21d9224123db62879ef423 yielded more interesting results. In addition to the details of the last logged-in
user, the plist ﬁle contained other information that could be
signiﬁcant to the forensic examiner. It stored a record of all
users that have previously logged into their Facebook
accounts using the Facebook application. This information
included user names, proﬁle IDs, and URL addresses pointing
to their proﬁle pictures on Facebook. Furthermore, the plist
ﬁle stored the details of the friends who had an active chat
session with the Facebook user. The details included the user
names of the friends, their proﬁle ID, URL addresses pointing
to their proﬁle pictures on Facebook, and a timestamp of
when the chat session was initiated.
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4.2.2.2. Twitter artifacts. The iPhone Twitter application had
two plist ﬁles that contained data that may be of signiﬁcance
to the forensic examiner: eb8899d553cf563080453f9a366600de1dcf6286 and f77282c60c3cee3ffce4a8bba2760
fd954d4921f. The ﬁrst ﬁle held the Twitter application’s user
information including the user name, URL link pointing to the
user’s proﬁle picture, tweets posted by the user, and the
timestamps of posted tweets. The second ﬁle contained the
user’s details plus some other information. It held records of
people followed by the user, their user names, detailed
information taken from their proﬁle pages, URL links pointing
to their proﬁle pictures, tweets posted by them, and the
timestamps of their posted tweets. Fig. 3 show the details of
a tweet posted by the user of the iPhone Twitter application
recovered from the ﬁrst iPhone ﬁle, and the corresponding
tweet extracted from the Twitter website.
4.2.2.3. MySpace artifacts. The iPhone MySpace application
had two ﬁles that contained data that may be of signiﬁcance
to the forensic examiner: a SQLite ﬁle 48598f280bb577d1e68
aaddadccba35c54acbb48 and a plist ﬁle e5cb579c7bdf12b996
bd865ecf6290ab94374abd. The SQLite ﬁle contained the user
name of the iPhone MySpace application, plus comments that
the user had posted in the stream with timestamps encoded
in absolute value. Table 3 shows a record of one of the posted
comments and its timestamp.
4.2.2.4. Dynamic directory. Another ﬁle that held data of
interest to this study was 0b68edc697a550c9b977b77cd
012fa9a0557dfcb. Examining the contents of the ﬁle in
a text editor showed that it started with the header
(DynamicDictionary-4) and stored snippets of text that had
been typed using the iPhone’s keyboard. Performing some
tests regarding the contents of this ﬁle showed that it stores
user keyboard inputs to applications on the iPhone;
including social networking applications. Parts of the
comments, emails, and chat messages that have been used
through the experiment; and were not stored elsewhere on
the backup ﬁles, were found in this ﬁle.

4.3. Android forensic examination
This section describes the process of the logical acquisition and forensic analysis of the Android phone (Samsung
GT-i9000 Galaxy S – Firmware version 2.3.3). Unlike other
smartphones, unless the Android phone was rooted, many
data ﬁles could not be accessed or backed up by backup
programs. Therefore, the tested Android phone was ﬁrst
rooted using Odin3 (version 1.3) to upload the root-kit (CF
Root XW).
Installing a root-kit allows the user to gain privilege
control over the Android OS (root access), allowing him to
bypass some limitations that the manufacturers put on the
device. Having a rooted Android phone also allows the user
to access protected directories on the system that hold user
data (e.g., /data/data directory) and backup all of the ﬁles in
these directories. These data ﬁles can hold a signiﬁcant
amount of data that may support an ongoing investigation.
The process is not uncontroversial in the forensics literature (see for example, the discussion in Vidas et al. (2011)),
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Fig. 1. The actual photos and comments as presented on the Facebook website.

and ideally, a thorough method of logical acquisition which
does not require rooting or other modiﬁcation of the software running on the Android device will be identiﬁed in
future research.
4.3.1. Logical acquisition
Unlike Blackberrys and iPhones, Android phones do not
have a uniﬁed management and backup solution. Various
companies have released different backup tools which give
the user the option of backing up the device on either the
phone’s SD Card or the company’s server. One such applications is MyBackup.
To acquire a logical backup of the Android phone,
MyBackup (v2.7.7) was installed on the test Android phone. A
new Micro SD external card was placed into the test phone.
The Micro SD card was selected as the location to store the
backup ﬁles. All three tested social networking applications
were selected, and the associated data ﬁles were backed up to
the external Micro SD card. Once the backup process was
completed, the Micro SD external card was removed from the
test phone and attached to the forensic workstation to
examine the backup ﬁles and perform the forensic analysis.
4.3.2. Examination and analysis
Acquiring a logical backup of the data ﬁles associated
with the Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace applications on
the Android phone using MyBackup resulted in the

creation of a backup directory on the external Micro SD
card. The Directory had the default path \rerware\MyBackup\AllAppsBackups\[AppsMedia_yyyy_mm_dd]\Apps.
The
directory contained three archive (ZIP) ﬁles, one for each
tested app:
 com.facebook.katana_4130.zip
 com.kozmo.kspace_4.zip
 com.twitter.android_134.zip

4.3.2.1. Facebook artifacts. The three backed up ﬁles were
copied to the forensic workstation, where each was
extracted and thoroughly examined for traces of the social
networking activities performed during the tests. The ﬁrst
ﬁle com.facebook.katana_4130.zip was associated with the
Facebook application. It contained three subdirectories:
databases, ﬁles, and lib, which contained a number of ﬁles.
The two directories that held relevant data for this study
were databases and ﬁles.
The databases folder held three SQLite ﬁles: fb.db,
webview.db, and webviewCache.db. Viewing each ﬁle
through the SQLite Database Browser and examining its
content yielded interesting results. The ﬁrst ﬁle fb.db contained tables that held records of activities performed by
the Android Facebook application user, including created
albums, chat messages, list of friends, friend data, mailbox

Fig. 2. Traces of uploading photos and posting comments using the iPhone Facebook application.
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Table 3
Record of a posted comment in MySpace.
ZTIMESTAMP

ZMESSAGE

Decoded timestamp

The weather
Saturday, 24 September
is getting better
2011 15:33:40 þ0400
The plist ﬁle contained the user name and password in clear text.
For example:
<dict>
<key>password</key>
<string>mushroom888</string>
<key>user name</key>
<string>infected.mushroom2011@hotmail.com</string>
</dict>

Fig. 3. The record of a “tweet” from the iPhone ﬁle, and the corresponding tweet on the Twitter website.

338556819.798738

messages, and uploaded photos. The records included
signiﬁcant information for the forensic investigator, such as
the users’ IDs, contents of exchanged messages, URL links of
uploaded pictures, and timestamps of performed activities.
The ﬁles folder contained a number of ﬁles with names
that consisted of seemingly random letters and numbers
and that did not have any extensions. Viewing the ﬁles in
a text editor and examining their headers showed the (JFIF)
marker segment, indicating that these ﬁles were (JPEG)
image ﬁles. Using Windows Photo Viewer to open the ﬁles
showed the actual image contained within each ﬁle. Images
contained within these ﬁles were either pictures that the
user had viewed from within the Android Facebook application or pictures that he uploaded from within the
application. Files of uploaded pictures had their names
preceded with the word “upload”.
4.3.2.2. Twitter artifacts. The second archive ﬁle com.twitter.android_134.zip was associated with the Android Twitter
application. It contained a folder called databases, which
contained three SQLite ﬁles. One of the ﬁles, 342525691.db,
stored interesting data. It contained tables that stored
records of posted tweets, photos, friends, users, and other
data associated with activities performed through the
Android Twitter application. Besides storing the author IDs,
timestamps, and contents of the posted tweets, the records
also stored data about the source of the posted tweets, e.g.,
posting through the website, an iPhone application, or an
Android phone application.
4.3.2.3. MySpace artifacts. The third archive ﬁle, com.kozmo.kspace_4.zip, was associated with the Android MySpace
application. It contained a folder called databases, which
contained three SQLite ﬁles. As mentioned earlier, the
tested MySpace application was not the ofﬁcial application
created by the MySpace company but a web-based application created by another group. Examining the three
SQLite ﬁles showed that they stored cookies and cache ﬁles
associated with navigating the MySpace website. It also
showed that the ﬁle webview.db stored the user name and
the password of the MySpace application in plain text.
4.4. Results summary
Table 4 summarizes the results of our analysis for each
application on each device examined.
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Table 4
The signiﬁcant social networking data that could be recovered from the
logical image of each smartphone.
Smartphone

Application

Description

BlackBerry
BlackBerry
BlackBerry
iPhone

Facebook
Twitter
MySpace
Facebook

iPhone

Twitter

iPhone

MySpace

Android

Facebook

Not found
Not found
Not found
User and friend data incl.
contact details and proﬁle
picture URLs
Photo uploads
Comments posted
Timestamps
All previously logged in users
Friends with active chat sessions
For user and people followed:
User names
Proﬁle picture URLs
Tweets posted
Timestamps
User name/Password
Posted comments
Timestamps
User and friend data incl.
contact details and proﬁle
Photo uploads
Created albums
Pictures viewed with app
Mailbox/Chat messages
For user and people followed:
User names
Posted tweets and photos
Other activity information
(e.g., device used to tweet)
User name/Password
Cookies & cache ﬁles

Android

Twitter

Android

MySpace

5. Future work
There are several major items of future work leading
directly from this study. First, more experimental cases are
required to examine a greater variety of smartphones and
social networking applications alike. Second, different
smartphones employ a variety of techniques to “lock” the
device’s interface and encrypt the data stored on the phone
while the device is locked, and these privacy measures also
serve as anti-forensics techniques to be overcome. Research
into this issue would likely require different techniques for
each smartphone platform.
6. Conclusions
Few studies have addressed the forensic analysis and
recovery of activities performed through social networking
applications on smartphones. These studies have also been
limited to the recovery of very basic information related to
the use of social networking applications. This study
focused on the recovery of artifacts and traces related to the
use of social networking applications on a variety of
smartphones using different operating systems. It aimed to
determine whether activities performed through these
applications are stored and can be recovered from the
internal memory of these smartphones. The tested social
networking applications were Facebook, Twitter, and
MySpace, which were used on BlackBerry, iPhone, and
Android.
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The study explored the forensic acquisition, analysis and
examination of the logical backup copies of the three
smartphones. The tests consisted of installing the social
networking applications on each device, conducting
common user activities through each application, acquiring
a forensically sound logical image of each device, and performing manual forensic analysis on each acquired logical
image. The forensic analysis determined the amount,
signiﬁcance, and location of social networking data that
could be found and retrieved from the logical image of each
device.
The results showed that no traces of social networking
activities could be recovered from BlackBerry devices.
However, iPhones and Android phones stored a signiﬁcant
amount of valuable data that could be recovered and used by
the forensic investigator. The paper documented the nature
of the social networking data that could be recovered from
each device and their locations from within the backup ﬁles.
We hope that the paper can inspire the creation of digital
forensics tools to extract and reconstruct social networking
data from a variety of modern smartphones.
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